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Grex > Agora41 > #113: Security nazis at Detroit airport | |
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| Author |
Message |
| 25 new of 167 responses total. |
bru
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response 75 of 167:
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Apr 30 00:40 UTC 2002 |
The box cutters were little keyring jobbies that no one thought about. They
do now.
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gull
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response 76 of 167:
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Apr 30 13:05 UTC 2002 |
Is it true the vending stands can't let you have plastic silverware to eat
your food with? (In flight it doesn't matter, since the airlines seem to
have mostly dropped food service.)
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aruba
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response 77 of 167:
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Apr 30 14:07 UTC 2002 |
It's certainly true that you can't bring plastic knives through security.
Forks and spoons are OK, though.
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oval
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response 78 of 167:
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Apr 30 18:17 UTC 2002 |
how bout them taco bell sporks?
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gull
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response 79 of 167:
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Apr 30 18:38 UTC 2002 |
"I'll spork your ass!" -- fast food restaurant cashier in "The Critic"
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scg
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response 80 of 167:
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Apr 30 21:07 UTC 2002 |
On my Ann Arbor trip a few weeks ago, I got upgraded to first class on the
way there, and flew coach on the way back. In first class, we were given a
metal fork, metal spoon, and plastic knife. I don't remember whether the
sandwich in coach came with any silverware at all.
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brighn
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response 81 of 167:
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Apr 30 21:49 UTC 2002 |
open barndoors;
while (horse is present) {do nothing}
close barndoors;
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mdw
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response 82 of 167:
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May 1 00:48 UTC 2002 |
The point I made above is that the terrorists were clearly expecting to
deal with El Al type security, and spent a lot of time researching
various ways to do whatever they wanted. The final approach they
adopted clearly wouldn't have worked with El Al, but just as obviously
worked fine against us. I think it's pretty likely that there had been
El Al style security, they would have adopted a different approach,
designed around that security, which would have been just as sucessful.
Or, if it hadn't been successful, they would have just waited, and tried
again with a different approach. *This* approach, as you may recall,
was *not* their 1st -- they had tried a different approach previous,
involving Singapore. *That* one was caught, and these guys were smart
enough to learn from their previous mistakes.
*That's* what makes it impossible to have perfect security, or even
sufficient security to stop people like the 9/11 terrorists. Every
security system has a potential weakness, and great security generally
involves great expense and massive amounts of inconvenience for
legitimate users. Sufficiently determined opponents who can scope out
the static defenses will always be able to get inside. Look at the
manigot line between Germany and France.
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bdh3
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response 83 of 167:
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May 1 03:06 UTC 2002 |
Yeah, but its better than doing nothing. The bad guys won't be
able to hijack with boxcutters or other innocuous seeming things,
plus the rules of the game have changed and passengers and crew
are no longer 'passive'. The current set of security proceedures
at least allows for protection against previous and past method
and will undoubtedly be raised as a result of the next event.
Imagine if we didn't screen baggage for weapons the way we did
even before 9/11 on account 'nobody can prevent a determined
attacker'. Do people not lock their doors because nobody can
prevent an expert from breaking in? Alarm systems can be defeated
by experts as well, yet you can get a discount on your house
insurance if you have one - an indication that the insurance industry
considers it at least effective enough in reducing its losses by
actively encouraging use.
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pthomas
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response 84 of 167:
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May 1 05:25 UTC 2002 |
Actually, Richard Reid (the "shoe bomber") flew on an El Al flight to see
if he could pull something there, and decided he couldn't hack it.
(By the way, why he didn't just go into the lavatory and set off the bomb
will always escape me.)
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mdw
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response 85 of 167:
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May 1 05:43 UTC 2002 |
Like I said, the current procedures merely protect against 'copycat'
terrorism. Comparing it with home alarm systems is actually a fairly
scary prospect. With home alarm systems, we expect and tolerate a
certain amount of burglary. Should we expect a certain number of
commercial turned kamikaze airflights each year?
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jared
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response 86 of 167:
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May 2 22:12 UTC 2002 |
Still safer than driving to the airport.
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mdw
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response 87 of 167:
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May 3 02:27 UTC 2002 |
If we've reached equilibrium. Should we be expecting wild swings each
way first?
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keesan
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response 88 of 167:
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May 3 21:02 UTC 2002 |
The last time I flew (to my grandfather's funeral in 1985) I had no checkon
luggage, just one suitcase, which they insisted on opening. They took away
the large black dial phone that my mother had tried to throw out, as a
possible weapon to be returned at the end of the flight, but let me keep my
grandfather's 2' long tapered rolling pin (for making strudel), which I
pointed out would have been a more convenient weapon. I suppose I could also
have tried to strangle someone with a long-sleeved shirt.
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scg
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response 89 of 167:
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May 3 22:05 UTC 2002 |
Telling the security people that something you're carrying is a potential
weapon probably isn't wise.
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other
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response 90 of 167:
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May 4 01:38 UTC 2002 |
I was bummed when my gaffer's tape was taken aty the gate of my flight to
Columbus, but they didn't blink at my 8ft long ethernet cable, with which I
could much more easily hogtie someone. Fuckin' idiotic, purely
public-appeasement based poilcy. There's no security, there is just an
illusion designed to maintain public confidence in the safety of air travel.
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lk
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response 91 of 167:
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May 4 17:10 UTC 2002 |
So? Tell us the rest of the story. Did you encounter anyone on the flight
that you wanted to tie up? Did you manage with just the 8' cable (probably
exaggerated and only 6', a much more common size) or did you really need
the tape? Enquiring and perverted minds have a right to know!
(:
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fitz
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response 92 of 167:
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May 4 22:17 UTC 2002 |
#90> I thought that only photographers and electricians knew it as gaffer's
tape outside the industry: are you one of them or is it known as such
elsewhere, other?
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ea
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response 93 of 167:
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May 5 00:22 UTC 2002 |
re 92 - People in TV and some people in theatrical production refer to
it as gaffer's tape as well.
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other
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response 94 of 167:
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May 5 19:26 UTC 2002 |
It is gaffer's tape, which is why it is referred to as same. I have been
in theatrical and video production for several years. The 8' estimate of
length on the crossover cable was not precise, and was probably short
rater than long. Common sizing isn't relevant, since I assembled the
cable (cut the length and put the connectors on) myself.
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lk
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response 95 of 167:
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May 5 20:12 UTC 2002 |
Thanks for the clarification, even though it sounds painful.
(:
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mary
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response 96 of 167:
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May 5 22:12 UTC 2002 |
(Which reminds me - nice job on the set for Special Relativity, Eric.)
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other
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response 97 of 167:
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May 6 02:57 UTC 2002 |
Huh? I wasn't involved in that one. I helped with "The White Rose" but
not "Special Relativity."
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mary
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response 98 of 167:
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May 6 03:48 UTC 2002 |
You were given credit in the program.
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other
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response 99 of 167:
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May 6 10:58 UTC 2002 |
Hmm. Maybe they were in a hurry and forgot to remove the reference when
they changed the file from the previous one. Or maybe I'm the
beneficiary of identity theft...
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