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| Author |
Message |
| 19 new of 68 responses total. |
oval
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response 50 of 68:
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May 7 18:52 UTC 2002 |
they probably would keep it secret, too. with no co-workers tapping their
phones.
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slynne
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response 51 of 68:
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May 7 19:17 UTC 2002 |
Well, it isnt really all that easy to keep office romances a secret but
probably no one would know *for sure* and all that would exist would be
rumor and speculation.
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oval
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response 52 of 68:
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May 7 19:30 UTC 2002 |
and some mysterious xerox's of someone's BUTT.
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slynne
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response 53 of 68:
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May 7 20:02 UTC 2002 |
well, better the butt than the well...you know.
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oval
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response 54 of 68:
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May 7 20:10 UTC 2002 |
the KOOTER?
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slynne
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response 55 of 68:
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May 7 20:26 UTC 2002 |
Hahaha. The "kooter"?
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brighn
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response 56 of 68:
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May 7 20:37 UTC 2002 |
*sings the theme to "Welcome Back, Kooter"*
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void
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response 57 of 68:
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May 7 20:50 UTC 2002 |
Kooter? That's way better than "front butt," which is what I was going
to suggest.
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oval
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response 58 of 68:
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May 7 20:53 UTC 2002 |
heh.
too bad there's no clinton/lewinsky front butt xeroxes circulating..
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gull
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response 59 of 68:
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May 8 01:08 UTC 2002 |
Wait, which Clinton are we talking about?
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gull
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response 60 of 68:
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May 17 13:06 UTC 2002 |
G8 Justice and Interior Ministers are pushing for countries to allow (or
possibly even require) retention of ISP customer traffic data, in the name
of preventing terrorism.
"To the extent that data protection legislation continues to permit the
retention of data only for billing purposes, such a position would overlook
crucial legitimate societal interests - particularly when applied to the
Internet service provider area, where flat rate pricing and free Internet
and E-mail services foreclose the need to retain traffic data for billing
purposes - and thereby seriously hamper public safety."
There's an article with links to the documents here:
http://www.theregus.com/content/6/24966.html
There's also an article by the Foundation for Information Policy Research
that explains why laws like this (and specifically one under consideration
in the UK) are a bad idea:
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2002dltr0005.html
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bdh3
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response 61 of 68:
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May 18 06:25 UTC 2002 |
I'm not gonna read those links - who knows who is watching and
keeping records...
I think it is a good practice as much as possible to keep a log
of as much as is practical. The telephone companies in the US
(and probably most of the rest of the world) keep records of
who calls whom - even if not for purposes of billing. I don't
know how long this data is retained nor how long it should be.
I do personally know that in the mid 1980s for example all
phone calls originating from or to any phone number in the
A2 area were logged by time, date, and duration, and the
originating number and destination number (sometimes inbound
calls didn't have that information) per corporate policy and
without benefit of legal warrant. I know this because of
personal visit and explaination of person who was in position
to know. At the time there wasn't the technology to store
the entire converstation of every call - that was reserved
for servicing warrants (rare) - eg it was too expensive to
pay for the number of Fujitsu Eagles and more hardware,
not that it couldn't have been done - they didn't see the
business reason to do so.
Times have changed, hardware is faster and storage is cheaper.
I do think it would be stupid for any government to require
all actual traffic to be stored. Its not that it couldn't
be done from a theoretical standpoint but the capability to
analyze such data or even index it is well beyond the the
capability of current technology. It doesn't make sense from
a business perspective for corporations to do so on their
own and it would be unfair to ask them to do so unfunded by
taxpayers and unfair to taxpayers for any government to
offer to fund such. Current such systems search data streams
for signatures of potentially interesting information and
store such but the analysis portion is often month later
if ever - and never in time to prevent. Taxpayer money
is better spent elsewhere.
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jazz
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response 62 of 68:
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May 21 22:45 UTC 2002 |
It's reasonably possible for very high-end systems to flag based on
content, but it would be very noticeable to someone who was trained in network
analysis, as it'd introduce a significant delay. Higher up (or lower, in the
case of X.25 networks) the OSI model, it'd be much easier to intercept
communications that are stored for any length of time at a given location
before being retransmitted.
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bdh3
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response 63 of 68:
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May 25 08:06 UTC 2002 |
How would you detect 'active monitoring' versus slow channel due to
congestion in the first place? How to detect 'store and forward'
vs 'store then forward'?
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gull
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response 64 of 68:
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May 25 20:57 UTC 2002 |
I suppose in theory, if you knew the network topology, you could detect a
delay where there shouldn't be one. In reality you usually don't know the
topology, and delays on a remote network are usually utterly swamped by the
variation in latency in networks in between.
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mdw
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response 65 of 68:
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May 26 00:44 UTC 2002 |
If you're using anything but quantum cryptography, it's trivial to "tee"
digital data.
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gull
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response 66 of 68:
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May 28 14:44 UTC 2002 |
On Ethernet a well-placed hub does a pretty good job...
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mdw
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response 67 of 68:
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May 29 01:18 UTC 2002 |
Right, but on ethernet you don't even need a hub; any host that can read
the ethernet can copy all the data it sees to disk without slowing other
hosts in any detectable way. A switching hub breaks this, but only by
breaking the original ethernet paradigm.
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gull
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response 68 of 68:
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May 29 13:00 UTC 2002 |
There are ways around switching hubs, too, but they're active techniques and
pretty obvious if anyone's paying attention.
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