|
Grex > Agora47 > #221: The Fall 2003 Electronic Voting Item | |
|
| Author |
Message |
| 21 new of 54 responses total. |
twenex
|
|
response 34 of 54:
| 
Dec 18 16:51 UTC 2003 |
Re: #29: If I could think of any way to have a clear public audit of
their code other than making it opensource, I'd be more inclined not
to demand they cease and desist their evil, bloodthirsty, proprietary,
corrupt, ultra-capitalist monopolistic ways.
|
twenex
|
|
response 35 of 54:
|
Dec 18 16:53 UTC 2003 |
Oops.
|
mcnally
|
|
response 36 of 54:
|
Dec 18 19:01 UTC 2003 |
re #29: I'm pretty sure that Microsoft *does* allow review of some
of its code, though it requires non-disclosure agreements and places
other restrictions on the process as well.
|
scott
|
|
response 37 of 54:
|
Dec 18 23:09 UTC 2003 |
Re 33:
Removable memory devices, WiFi interfaces, and "updated" software which is
not the same as the officially approved software.
Those are all things I've seen mentioned in various stories about voting
computers.
|
gull
|
|
response 38 of 54:
|
Dec 18 23:28 UTC 2003 |
Re resp:36: Yes. In fact, I'm told there are plenty of outside
companies with access to Microsoft source code under various agreements.
(This is probably why you occasionally see Windows source code leaked.)
|
jmsaul
|
|
response 39 of 54:
|
Dec 18 23:50 UTC 2003 |
I think we need to say "tough shit" on the trade secret issue, and make it
a requirement that you have to open your code if you're going to sell
electronic voting machines.
Either that, or add a paper audit trail.
Your choice.
|
richard
|
|
response 40 of 54:
|
Dec 19 03:37 UTC 2003 |
electronic voting? here in new york city, we don't even have voting booths
that use electricity! We still use these old clunkers, that weigh about
a thousand pounds each, where the ballot is spread out over an entire
wall and you have to flip switches and pull the lever. See, it takes
manpower to set up those old voting booths, and the unions control that
manpower. And the unions run new york city. So we won't get to
electronic voting here until/if we get to the point where we phase out the
out manual voting booths, which doesn't seem like it will ever happen
|
russ
|
|
response 41 of 54:
|
Dec 19 05:56 UTC 2003 |
Re #21: We'd call it Chicago. ;-)
|
jp2
|
|
response 42 of 54:
|
Dec 19 11:32 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
|
gull
|
|
response 43 of 54:
|
Dec 19 15:20 UTC 2003 |
Diebold may get their knuckles rapped:
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/business/7511145.htm
"SACRAMENTO - Secretary of State Kevin Shelley said Tuesday that Diebold
Elections Systems could lose the right to sell electronic voting
machines in California after state auditors found the company
distributed software that had not been approved by election officials.
"The auditors reported that voters in 17 California counties cast
ballots in recent elections using software that had not been certified
by the state. And voters in Los Angeles County and two smaller counties
voted on machines installed with software that was not approved by the
Federal Election Commission."
Diebold's president, Bob Urosevich, said the changes were "cosmetic" and
blamed the counties for not tracking the software more closely.
|
other
|
|
response 44 of 54:
|
Dec 19 16:09 UTC 2003 |
Of COURSE he did.
|
other
|
|
response 45 of 54:
|
Dec 19 16:10 UTC 2003 |
(And that alone should result in the ban being put into place.)
|
klg
|
|
response 46 of 54:
|
Dec 19 17:31 UTC 2003 |
Herr richard:
Careful, buddy. Going around badmouthing unions like that will get you
drummed out of the Democratic Party.
klg
|
mcnally
|
|
response 47 of 54:
|
Dec 19 19:02 UTC 2003 |
re #42:
> The BIN will be such that only the voter can identify his ballot later.
Any security scheme which relies on the voter to "identify his
ballot later" sounds to me to be both (a) unworkably cumbersome,
and (b) too susceptible to post-election voter manipulation.
Imagine this kind of validation were used in the 2000 presidential
election. How much do you think it would have been worth to either
party to change or invalidate a few hundred votes in Florida?
re #43:
> Diebold's president, Bob Urosevich, said the changes were "cosmetic"
> and blamed the counties for not tracking the software more closely.
So Bob Urosevich is blaming California for not repeating what one
would hope is a lengthy and thorough certification process for the
sake of "cosmetic" changes to the software. (Note: one *hopes*
that it's a lengthy and thorough certification process, but one fears
that it is not..)
|
jp2
|
|
response 48 of 54:
|
Dec 19 19:43 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
|
mcnally
|
|
response 49 of 54:
|
Dec 19 20:25 UTC 2003 |
I understand that you could do that but if the whole vote relies on
voter-held information for verification purposes, then a suborned voter
could essentially withdraw their ballot by claiming it invalid. In a
close election, that could be enough to throw the race to the other side.
And if the information supplied to the voter isn't necessary to validate
her ballot, then what's it for?
|
jp2
|
|
response 50 of 54:
|
Dec 19 20:46 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
|
mcnally
|
|
response 51 of 54:
|
Dec 19 23:05 UTC 2003 |
If the presumption is that the counted ballot is valid unless
the voter can prove otherwise, how does that differ from the
current system?
|
jp2
|
|
response 52 of 54:
|
Dec 19 23:27 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
|
gelinas
|
|
response 53 of 54:
|
Dec 19 23:36 UTC 2003 |
Are these paper ballots or just electronic ballots? If the latter, how is
a voter to know that the counting of her ballot _should_ be challenged?
|
jp2
|
|
response 54 of 54:
|
Dec 19 23:46 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
|