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25 new of 184 responses total.
gull
response 25 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 12:32 UTC 2002

I think there are real concerns, here.  I don't really want to see them
glossed over just because jp2 brought them up.
aruba
response 26 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 13:05 UTC 2002

David (gull) - I too would like to discuss this rationally.  I respect
your opinion as a reasonable person, and I would like to do what I can to
make sure the ID information we collect is secure.  Forgive me if I
misremember, but I think your suggestion for what to do is "destroy copies
and records of ID as soon as they are verified".  The thing is, I don't
"verify" ID, I just record it, and count on being able to retrieve it if
necessary.  So I don't see how your plan would work - maybe you could
explain it to me.
mdw
response 27 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 13:32 UTC 2002

I believe most of the acts quoted in #15 (certainly EPCA) mainly deal
with unauthorized disclosure of information to 3rd parties.  Most of
these acts do not pertain to the legitimate use of information within
one organization (some contain specific language to authorize this), and
certain other kinds of disclosure are also authorized (for instance,
EPCA specifically authorizes (but does not require) disclosure of a
crime that is discovered doing some unrelated business activity, such as
repairing filesystem damage.)  I know of little within these acts that
restricts a companies ability to to either be incredibly nosey, or to
save those facts -- and there are a *lot* of companies in corporate
america that do amazingly gacky things.  I don't think grex is doing
anything particular gacky or unreasonable.  Possibly we could fix many
of these problems by making members sign some sort of membership
agreement, though I can't say I'm all that fond of creating more
paperwork, and personally find membership agreements in themselves kinda
gacky.
jp2
response 28 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 13:37 UTC 2002

This response has been erased.

other
response 29 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 13:58 UTC 2002

re #25: I'm not denying the legitimacy of the point.  I acknowledged it 
earlier.  I'm mostly responding to tod's posting and jp2's typically 
hysterical behavior.  

Hmm.  Jamie, if you refuse to become a member, how do you ever expect to 
be elected to the board?
jp2
response 30 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 14:32 UTC 2002

This response has been erased.

gull
response 31 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 14:49 UTC 2002

I mostly just feel strongly that retaining credit card information is a bad
idea -- it exposes Grex to liability if that information is stolen.  I
realize that's no longer a major concern, since we don't accept credit cards
anymore, but any remaining numbers should probably be stored offline -- on
paper or on removable media.  I'm less concerned about things like names and
addresses, since those are essentially public information anyway.
cross
response 32 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 14:55 UTC 2002

Regarding #31; I believe Mark has already moved the last of the credit
card information offline, onto paper.  Don't forget, though, that some
states' driver's licenses have SSN's on them.
mynxcat
response 33 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 15:03 UTC 2002

Thats a point i was going to bring up. What about SSN information on the
licenses?
aruba
response 34 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 15:27 UTC 2002

First of all, the credit card numbers were never available to anyone
online, unless they hacked into my machine while it happened to be
connected to the internet with a non-fixed IP address.  (Most of the time
I'm online I dial into Grex anyway.)

I did indeed move both remaining credit card numbers off my computer and
onto paper.  I don't record SSNs on drivers' licenses unless they *are*
the driver's license numbers - do any states still do that?
jep
response 35 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 16:01 UTC 2002

Mark, I had thought you received ID information from users just to 
verify they're real people, in order to prevent one person using 
multiple votes.  If that were the case, you could confirm the person 
exists, then destroy the information you'd received other than the 
person's real name, and Grex's requirements would be satisfied.

It turns out Grex has more requirements than I had realized.  Would it 
make sense to just keep verification information for those who want to 
use Grex's Internet services and not for the rest?  You don't need my 
verification information, for example, since I never use Grex's 
outbound Internet services.  I'm just using me as an example.  I don't 
care if you keep any verification information you have about me.

I'm not concerned about this issue at all, other than to make sure the 
treasurer and Grex are not exposed to lawsuits or other repercussions 
if someone gets some personal information they shouldn't.
cmcgee
response 36 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 16:47 UTC 2002

Right now, the compter file for allowing outbound acces is very simple:  it
is identical to the file of "members".  This file is also identical to the
file "allowed to vote".  

It seems to me that what jep is suggesting is that we retain the members file
for voting, but create a different, and separately maintained members file
for outbound access.  

I think this needlessly complicates the task of accumulating data for the
two separate purposes.  I think our current system: verifying your
existance for voting purposes and some trackable data for security
purposes is all accomplished with one document, stored one place, and used
for two purposes. 


jep
response 37 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 17:45 UTC 2002

I agree my suggestion complicates things.
scott
response 38 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 17:55 UTC 2002

I think it's a non-issue, inflated out of proportion by jp2 as some sort of
ego massage.
aruba
response 39 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 18:12 UTC 2002

I tend to agree with Colleen, though as I said before, I will do whatever
the board and the membership direct me to do.  John's suggestion is
implementable, but it would take some work.  Among other things, it would
require people to declare, when they become members, whether they want to
use internet access, which in turn requires that they be confronted with
the technical explanation of what that means (i.e., which protocols anyone
can use and which are reserved for members only).  I'm not inclined toward
things which make it harder to become a member than it already is,
especially when our membership is down from where we'd like it to be.

It would be simpler for me to just store all ID information on paper.  I'd
rather not do that, just because I think it's not very efficient.  A less
drastic action would be to encrypt all ID information on my computer.  I
could probably find a way to do that which wouldn't be too difficult to
deal with, though I would welcome suggestions from people who know more
about security that I for what a good, efficient system would be.
gull
response 40 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 18:34 UTC 2002

Re #38: Jp2's been searching very hard for something to be outraged about
for a long time now, it's true, and he finally found something.  I do think
there's a real issue here, but I don't feel quite as strongly about it as
jp2.
jp2
response 41 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 19:23 UTC 2002

This response has been erased.

mary
response 42 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 19:43 UTC 2002

For some it would be a real step-up and cause for celebration.
cmcgee
response 43 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 20:45 UTC 2002

No, 'fraid not.  They don't give you a personality transplant when someone
steals your identity.  
other
response 44 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 21:26 UTC 2002

Too bad.  Poor Jamie's just begging for one.
jp2
response 45 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 21:33 UTC 2002

This response has been erased.

aruba
response 46 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 21:51 UTC 2002

It seems to me we are balancing three ideals here, which I hope we can all
agree are good things:

1) Protecting the privacy of our members,
2) Being good netizens (which means discouraging illicit use of Grex and
   having available the information needed to follow up when it happens),
   and
3) Keeping Grex alive and healthy (which means, among other things, making
   it as easy as possible to become a member and stay a member, and
   keeping the treasurer's job reasonable so there will always be someone
   willing to do it).

Obviously we can't achieve perfection in all three at the same time; we
have to find an acceptable compromise.  I hear people (gull and cross in
particular) saying that they think the current system needs more of ideal
1).  OK, fine; but before changing any policies, we should consider the
effect on all three ideals.

I'll repeat that I'm not trying to be a stick-in-the-mud here - if most
people think we should have a different compromise than we have now, then
I'll implement it.
cross
response 47 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 21:58 UTC 2002

I think that shifting a smallish amount of the burden to the member is
acceptable; dropping a photocopy of a driver's license or other ID with
an address on it isn't terribly difficult; one is often required to do
so when, e.g., moving and getting a utility turned on (ie, a phone or
similar).  Yeah, one detracts *slightly* from Mark's 3rd ideal, but in
practice, not much.  Grex's treasurer then just has the job of saying,
``yup, this is the address they told me.  Let me copy it down and destroy
my photocopy.''  I think that might increase (perhaps not the best word,
bear with me) Ideal 2, and certainly will enhance Ideal 1.
aruba
response 48 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 4 22:11 UTC 2002

Quite often, actually, the address on someone's driver's license *doesn't*
match the address they want their handbook sent to.  I assume it's because
they have moved, but I also assume that the police could track them down
more easily with the driver's license number than without it.

I'll submit that having me destroy the ID doesn't enhance ideal 1) any
more than simply having me store it in an encrypted form, which makes my
job a little harder but doesn't otherwise detract from ideal 3).  And if
we come up with the right system, I think my job need not be much harder
at all.  And I do think that destroying all record of the ID might
significantly detract from ideal 2); however, we would need the opinion of
a law-enforcment official to say for sure. 

carson
response 49 of 184: Mark Unseen   Sep 5 00:26 UTC 2002

(I think Dan's suggestion as presented in resp:47 is reasonable.  plus, if
it's really necessary to hang on to the specific ID information in its
"original" [to Grex] form, I can't see a reason [aside from Mark's
suggestion of making it easier for expired members to renew] to hang on to
that information once the membership [and grace period] expires.)

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