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| 25 new of 411 responses total. |
mcnally
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response 100 of 411:
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Apr 12 10:33 UTC 2002 |
Which begs the question -- what happens to music that's even "new-agier"
or more "ambient" than ordinary Muzak when a Muzak version is performed?
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other
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response 101 of 411:
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Apr 12 10:51 UTC 2002 |
It's all in the instrumentation.
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jp2
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response 102 of 411:
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Apr 12 12:58 UTC 2002 |
This response has been erased.
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scott
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response 103 of 411:
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Apr 12 13:16 UTC 2002 |
"Muzak" is a specific company with their own production. Supposedly music
is scheduled throughout the day with specific tempo, groove, mood, etc. And
it all has to sound like Muzak; ie the same instrumentation and production.
Otherwise it would stand out and be distracting.
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brighn
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response 104 of 411:
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Apr 12 14:17 UTC 2002 |
Yeah, yeh, I know the theory. Muzak is usually sans vocals, for instance. Enya
Muzaked actually sounds like the karoake track (no vocals, more violins).
#102> Which begs the question... how SHUOLD it be used? ;}
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morwen
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response 105 of 411:
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Apr 12 14:35 UTC 2002 |
Yeah, Jamie, you brought it up. How SHOUld we use the phrase "beg the
question?"
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brighn
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response 106 of 411:
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Apr 12 14:41 UTC 2002 |
(I believe Jamie is referring to this: http://skepdic.com/begging.html)
As a rhetoric device, "begging the question" is expressing a tautology. But
"begging the question" is being increasingly used to mean something like,
"raises the question that perhaps wasn't intended." I'll admit that I do the
latter, myself, and as much as I probably agree with Jamie that I shouldn't,
it's a habit, so I'll probably forget this conversation and keep doing it.
;}
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brighn
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response 107 of 411:
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Apr 12 14:49 UTC 2002 |
A good article on the issue is at http://www.quinion.com/words/qa/qa-beg1.h
tm
There the author advises against using "beg the question" in the sense of
"raise the question," but also admits that "expert" opinion is becoming split,
and that several dictionaries now list "raise the question" as an acceptable
definition.
I wonder if "tautology" is making its way into formal logic as a full
replacement for "beg the question," to distance the more traditional
rhetorical meaning from the newer one?
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flem
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response 108 of 411:
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Apr 12 15:21 UTC 2002 |
My understanding is that it isn't exactly "expressing a tautology", but
arguing using circular reasoning; the example in the url quoted below is:
"lying is wrong because we ought always to tell the truth".
http://www.quinion.com/words/qa/qa-beg1.htm
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morwen
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response 109 of 411:
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Apr 12 15:22 UTC 2002 |
Okay, Paul. Pardon me for sounding ignorant. What is "tautology"?
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bhelliom
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response 110 of 411:
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Apr 12 15:39 UTC 2002 |
That's okay, morwen . . . I'm without a clue here myself. You're not
alone.
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orinoco
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response 111 of 411:
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Apr 12 15:56 UTC 2002 |
A tautology is a statement that must logically be true no matter what's going
on in the world. So "the sky is blue" is true if the sky is blue, and "the
sky is not blue" is true if it isn't -- both depend on the world for their
truth, so they're not tautological. "Either the sky is blue or it isn't" is
true anywhere, at any time, regardless of what the sky's doing -- _that's_
a tautology.
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brighn
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response 112 of 411:
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Apr 12 16:22 UTC 2002 |
#108> The way that "tautology" was being used in the last Agora. Myself, I'm
used to tautology to be as transparent as Orinoco's example, but then, that's
because they *do* have pragmatic relevance. For instance:
"Boys will be boys."
is a tautology, and a perfect example of what I'm used to. It's a common
sentence, and there's no semantic purpose to saying it. Its relevance as
something that's said comes from the implications. I've been known to say to
misbehaving toddlers, "Quit acting your age!" -- with similar implications
to "Boys will be boys" (i.e., there are certain characteristics that
boys/children have, and no amount of scolding or chastising will change that).
However, in the last Agora, it seemed to me that "tautology" was being used
for more subtle cases, where the person using the word was claiming that the
argument presented reduced down to a tautology. Indeed, beggin the question
*does* reduce down to a tautology. For instance:
"Lying is wrong because we ought to always tell the truth."
On the assumption that if X is moral, then ~X is immoral, then we can
translate this example:
"Lying is wrong because telling the truth is right."
and then to:
"Lying is wrong because lying is wrong."
This statement is only true if the presupposition[1] is true, and that
presupposition is "lying is wrong." Therefore:
"Lying is wrong because lying is wrong if lying is wrong."
which is clearly a tautology. =}
So, for the philosophers here, is there an example of "begging the question"
that can't be reduced down to such a tautology?
[1] A presupposition of a statement is a claim that must be true for the
statement to have a truth value. If the presupposition of a statement is not
true, then the statement itself is nonsensical. For instance:
-- Have you stopped beating your wife?
has the presupposition
-- You used to beat your wife.
One of my favorite presuppositions is in Alice in Wonderland, when the Mad
Hatter asks Alice is she'd like any more tea, and Alice pouts that she can't
have any more tea, because she hasn't had any at all yet.
An entailment, or implication, of a statement is a claim that must be true
for the statement to be true. For instance:
-- I like both peas and carrots.
entails
-- I like peas.
Note that:
-- I don't like peas.
entails
-- I don't like both peas and carrots.
(and hence, "I like both peas and carrots" does not *presuppose* "I like
peas," because the negation of the latter does not prohibit the former from
having a truth value)
If A entails B and ~A entails B, then A presupposes B.
(That is, "You've stopped beating your wife" entails "You used to beat your
wife," and "You haven't stopped beating your wife" entails "You used to beat
your wife.")
Side note on the example: This example appears in nearly every Intro
Linguistics book, at least when I was in Grad School, probably because it
allows a segue into how linguists can advice the court system on what are and
are not "fair" questions to ask. Clearly, the example is not a fair question,
because there's no way for a witness to answer "yes" or "no" that doesn't
self-=incrimination.
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jp2
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response 113 of 411:
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Apr 12 17:29 UTC 2002 |
This response has been erased.
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jp2
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response 114 of 411:
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Apr 12 17:41 UTC 2002 |
This response has been erased.
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bhelliom
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response 115 of 411:
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Apr 12 17:55 UTC 2002 |
I've never actually gotten around to really learning this . . . I've
been meaning to, but some other subject would always be a higher
priority.
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brighn
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response 116 of 411:
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Apr 12 18:27 UTC 2002 |
#114> Nice excerpt. That explains the origin of "beg the question" in a way
that makes sense to me.
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remmers
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response 117 of 411:
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Apr 12 19:28 UTC 2002 |
The statement "Safire is suspect because he misspelled the name
of James Madison's wife (Hello, Dolley!)." is suspect.
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tpryan
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response 118 of 411:
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Apr 12 20:11 UTC 2002 |
Is it safe post again?
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flem
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response 119 of 411:
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Apr 12 20:33 UTC 2002 |
There is a critical, fundamental difference between the statements
"lying is wrong because lying is wrong" and "if lying is wrong, then lying
is wrong". The former asserts absolutely that lying is wrong and provides
an explanation; the latter only conditionally asserts this. In slightly
different language that emphasizes the difference, we have:
1. The proposition "lying is wrong" is true, because lying is wrong.
2. The proposition "if lying is wrong, then lying is wrong" is true.
Circular reasoning is not tautology. Tautology may be considered vacuous,
but it is logically valid reasoning. Circular reasoning is not logically
valid.
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jp2
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response 120 of 411:
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Apr 12 20:44 UTC 2002 |
This response has been erased.
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flem
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response 121 of 411:
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Apr 12 21:06 UTC 2002 |
You're either not paying attention or you're being a dumbass for some obscure
purpose. In case it's the former, please reread #119 until you understand
that circular reasoning cannot ever reduce to tautology.
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oval
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response 122 of 411:
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Apr 12 21:24 UTC 2002 |
everytime i reread 119 it seems to prove 120 correct.
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brighn
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response 123 of 411:
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Apr 12 21:34 UTC 2002 |
Hey, now, I'm on Jamie's side on this one. Apparently, Greg, if someone
disagrees with you, that's grounds for insulting them.
I've already provided an argument for why all circular reasoning reduces to
tautologies. Do I have the right to call you a dumbass, Greg? (I won't,
regardless.)
At any rate, let's go through this again, and identify what appears to be the
difference of opinion.
(1) Lying is wrong because lying is wrong.
(2) Lying is wrong.
(1) entails (2). That is to say, if (2) is false, then (1) is not true.
Clearly, we can build a tautology based on (2) as well:
(3) If lying is wrong, then lying is wrong.
I presume my argument so far is non-controversial. It may be the case that
(1) entails things other than (2), but that's not relevant to the argument.
Now, we have two scenarios:
(a) (1) is true iff (2) is true
(b) (1) entails (2), but also has some other conditions on its truth value
If (a), then:
(3) If lying is wrong, then (2)
requires
(3) If lying is wrong, then (1)
and therefore
(1) iff (3)
(since (1) iff (2), and (2) entails (3)).
Hence my argument that all circular reasoning reduces to a tautology.
That's not to say, though, that circular reasoning and tautologies are
logically equivalent. (3) is logically sound, and always true, regardless of
whether (2) is true. (1) is only true in exactly the same universes as those
in which (2) is true. I disagree with the implication "A because A" would
never appear in a well-structured logical proof; it could easily appear as
a bridge where two complex calculations to either side of an equation are
reduced to the same intermediary value. It *is* true that "A because A" is
only true in those universes where A is true, while "If A then A" is true in
all universes (assuming a standard structure of logic... metalogic paradoxes
sometimes forc eus to sidestep "If A then A"), but I'd say that the statements
are, otherwise, equally logically vacuous, and only serve as intermediary
steps of larger arguments.
... which feels like me coming around and mostly agreeing with flem, but don't
call Jamie a dumbass when he's not being one. ;}
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brighn
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response 124 of 411:
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Apr 12 21:38 UTC 2002 |
And somehow I feel that #123 had a softshoe subterfuge meant to defend 112,
and it feels intellectually dishonest somehow, but oh well.
Maybe I *was* wrong in #112, but flem's equally wrong in saying that circular
reasoning is logically invalid. IMHO. ;}
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