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Grex > Coop13 > #15: Why was its password changed? | |
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| Author |
Message |
dah
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Why was its password changed?
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Aug 29 15:35 UTC 2003 |
The polytarp account.
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| 110 responses total. |
valerie
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response 1 of 110:
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Aug 30 03:27 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
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janc
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response 2 of 110:
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Aug 30 03:55 UTC 2003 |
Yup, if an account has it's mail forwarded to abc@xyz.com, then we'll
happily reset the password and mail it to abc@xyz.com. Apparantly
those who actually wade through the awesome heap of staff mail we get
every day were being annoyed by the extraneous mail, and decided to take
a slightly creative approach to fixing the problem. Certainly fits
long standing policy.
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dah
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response 3 of 110:
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Aug 30 15:45 UTC 2003 |
O? So, basically, you're saying you're allowed to violate the privacy of
people who do things you don't like?
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slynne
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response 4 of 110:
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Aug 30 15:58 UTC 2003 |
No, only to people who foolishly forward their email to staff.
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dah
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response 5 of 110:
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Aug 30 16:22 UTC 2003 |
Yes, something staff doesn't like.
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cross
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response 6 of 110:
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Aug 30 16:55 UTC 2003 |
No, we're saying that there's a longstanding policy that's been followed.
It has nothing to do with liking or not liking anything.
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dah
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response 7 of 110:
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Aug 30 17:41 UTC 2003 |
"were being annoyed" indicates they disliked it.
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cross
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response 8 of 110:
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Aug 30 18:00 UTC 2003 |
That's an aside.
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davel
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response 9 of 110:
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Aug 30 18:06 UTC 2003 |
Try reading with some attention. The policy, as stated by Valerie, is that
if the recipient of forwarded mail objects, to reset the password and send
the new password to the forwarding recipient. This isn't "violating the
privacy of people who do things you don't like", but preventing email abuse.
That the recipient of forwarded email didn't like it is the trigger for the
policy; that's what abuse of email means.
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davel
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response 10 of 110:
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Aug 30 18:06 UTC 2003 |
(#8 slipped in; my response was to #7.)
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dah
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response 11 of 110:
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Aug 30 18:37 UTC 2003 |
You hardly have to give people access to all the abuser's files and E-mail
to prevent abuse, Lovelace.
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i
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response 12 of 110:
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Aug 30 22:02 UTC 2003 |
A .forward file pointing to e-mail account X is fairly convincing proof
that the owner of the grex account trusts the person(s) with access to
X to read all of his/her personal e-mail. Access to e-mail is accepted
as proof of authority/ownership quite widely on the internet. I think
this is a pretty reasonable policy for grex to follow.
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valerie
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response 13 of 110:
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Aug 31 00:58 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
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dah
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response 14 of 110:
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Aug 31 01:43 UTC 2003 |
O please. You said you mail person A's password to person B, just as though
a .forward to person B means the two are the same person. But, of course,
in doing that you give access to all of person A's private files and archived
mail to person B, and you said you did the same thing here with staff. This
clearly indicates you've violated both polytarp's and other people's privacy.
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gelinas
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response 15 of 110:
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Aug 31 02:10 UTC 2003 |
If Person A IS Person B, his privacy has NOT been violated. A forwarding ALL
mail to B is prima facie evidence that B IS A.
Yes, Staff knew that they were not Polytarp. However, the policy still
applies: Polytarp forwarding ALL mail to Staff is prima facie evidence that
Polytarp considers Staff to be himself.
If you don't like that, don't forward your mail to staff.
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