response 1 of 173:

Apr 25 06:26 UTC 2002

http://foxnews.com/story/0,2933,50830,00.html

Following is a transcripted excerpt from Fox News Sunday, April 21, 2002. 

BRIT HUME, FOX NEWS: Former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross has worked to
achieve Middle East peace throughout President Clinton's final days in office.
In the months following Clinton's failed peace summit at Camp David, U.S.
negotiators continued behind-the-scenes peace talks with the Palestinians and
Israelis up until January 2001, and that followed Clinton's presentation of
ideas at the end of December 2000. 

Dennis Ross joins us now with more details on all that, and Fred Barnes joins
the questioning. 

So, Dennis, talk to us a little bit, if you can -- I might note that we're
proud to able to say that you're a Fox News contributing analyst. 

DENNIS ROSS: Thank you. 

HUME: Talk to us about the sequence of events. The Camp David talks, there
was an offer. That was rejected. Talks continued. You come now to December,
and the president has a new set of ideas. What unfolded? 

ROSS: Let me give you the sequence, because I think it puts all this in
perspective. 

Number one, at Camp David we did not put a comprehensive set of ideas on the
table. We put ideas on the table that would have affected the borders and
would have affected Jerusalem. 

Arafat could not accept any of that. In fact, during the 15 days there, he
never himself raised a single idea. His negotiators did, to be fair to them,
but he didn't. The only new idea he raised at Camp David was that the temple
didn't exist in Jerusalem, it existed in Nablus. 

HUME: This is the temple where Ariel Sharon paid a visit, which was used as
a kind of a pre-text for the beginning of the new intifada, correct? 

ROSS: This is the core of the Jewish faith. 

HUME: Right. 

ROSS: So he was denying the core of the Jewish faith there. 

After the summit, he immediately came back to us and he said, "We need to have
another summit," to which we said, "We just shot our wad. We got a no from
you. You're prepared actually do a deal before we go back to something like
that." 

He agreed to set up a private channel between his people and the Israelis,
which I joined at the end of August. And there were serious discussions that
went on, and we were poised to present our ideas the end of September, which
is when the intifada erupted. He knew we were poised to present the ideas.
His own people were telling him they looked good. And we asked him to
intervene to ensure there wouldn't be violence after the Sharon visit, the
day after. He said he would. He didn't lift a finger. 

Now, eventually we were able to get back to a point where private channels
between the two sides led each of them to again ask us to present the ideas.
This was in early December. We brought the negotiators here. 

HUME: Now, this was a request to the Clinton administration... 

ROSS: Yes. 

HUME: ... to formulate a plan. Both sides wanted this? 

ROSS: Absolutely. 

HUME: All right. 

ROSS: Both sides asked us to present these ideas. 

HUME: All right. And they were? 

ROSS: The ideas were presented on December 23 by the president, and they
basically said the following: On borders, there would be about a 5 percent
annexation in the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there
would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the Palestinians.

On Jerusalem, the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the
capitol of the Palestinian state. 

On the issue of refugees, there would be a right of return for the refugees
to their own state, not to Israel, but there would also be a fund of $30
billion internationally that would be put together for either compensation
or to cover repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation costs. 

And when it came to security, there would be a international presence, in
place of the Israelis, in the Jordan Valley. 

These were ideas that were comprehensive, unprecedented, stretched very far,
represented a culmination of an effort in our best judgment as to what each
side could accept after thousands of hours of debate, discussion with each
side. 

FRED BARNES, WEEKLY STANDARD: Now, Palestinian officials say to this day that
Arafat said yes. 

ROSS: Arafat came to the White House on January 2. Met with the president,
and I was there in the Oval Office. He said yes, and then he added
reservations that basically meant he rejected every single one of the things
he was supposed to give. 

HUME: What was he supposed to give? 

ROSS: He supposed to give, on Jerusalem, the idea that there would be for the
Israelis sovereignty over the Western Wall, which would cover the areas that
are of religious significance to Israel. He rejected that. 

HUME: He rejected their being able to have that? 

ROSS: He rejected that. 

He rejected the idea on the refugees. He said we need a whole new formula,
as if what we had presented was non-existent. 

He rejected the basic ideas on security. He wouldn't even countenance the idea
that the Israelis would be able to operate in Palestinian airspace. 

You know when you fly into Israel today you go to Ben Gurion. You fly in over
the West Bank because you can't -- there's no space through otherwise. He
rejected that. 

So every single one of the ideas that was asked of him he rejected. 

HUME: Now, let's take a look at the map. Now, this is what -- how the Israelis
had created a map based on the president's ideas. And... 

ROSS: Right. 

HUME: ... what can we -- that situation shows that the territory at least is
contiguous. What about Gaza on that map? 

ROSS: The Israelis would have gotten completely out of Gaza. 

ROSS: And what you see also in this line, they show an area of temporary
Israeli control along the border. 

HUME: Right. 

ROSS: Now, that was an Israeli desire. That was not what we presented. But
we presented something that did point out that it would take six years before
the Israelis would be totally out of the Jordan Valley. 

So that map there that you see, which shows a very narrow green space along
the border, would become part of the orange. So the Palestinians would have
in the West Bank an area that was contiguous. Those who say there were
cantons, completely untrue. It was contiguous. 

HUME: Cantons being ghettos, in effect... 

ROSS: Right. 

HUME: ... that would be cut off from other parts of the Palestinian state.

ROSS: Completely untrue. 

And to connect Gaza with the West Bank, there would have been an elevated
highway, an elevated railroad, to ensure that there would be not just safe
passage for the Palestinians, but free passage. 

BARNES: I have two other questions. One, the Palestinians point out that this
was never put on paper, this offer. Why not? 

ROSS: We presented this to them so that they could record it. When the
president presented it, he went over it at dictation speed. He then left the
cabinet room. I stayed behind. I sat with them to be sure, and checked to be
sure that every single word. 

The reason we did it this way was to be sure they had it and they could record
it. But we told the Palestinians and Israelis, if you cannot accept these
ideas, this is the culmination of the effort, we withdraw them. We did not
want to formalize it. We wanted them to understand we meant what we said. You
don't accept it, it's not for negotiation, this is the end of it, we withdraw
it. 

So that's why they have it themselves recorded. And to this day, the
Palestinians have not presented to their own people what was available. 

BARNES: In other words, Arafat might use it as a basis for further
negotiations so he'd get more? 

ROSS: Well, exactly. 

HUME: Which is what, in fact, he tried to do, according to your account. 

ROSS: We treated it as not only a culmination. We wanted to be sure it
couldn't be a floor for negotiations. 

HUME: Right. 

ROSS: It couldn't be a ceiling. It was the roof. 

HUME: This was a final offer? 

ROSS: Exactly. Exactly right. 

HUME: This was the solution. 

BARNES: Was Arafat alone in rejecting it? I mean, what about his negotiators?

ROSS: It's very clear to me that his negotiators understood this was the best
they were ever going to get. They wanted him to accept it. He was not prepared
to accept it. 

HUME: Now, it is often said that this whole sequence of talks here sort of
fell apart or ended or broke down or whatever because of the intervention of
the Israeli elections. What about that? 

ROSS: The real issue you have to understand was not the Israeli elections.
It was the end of the Clinton administration. The reason we would come with
what was a culminating offer was because we were out of time. 

They asked us to present the ideas, both sides. We were governed by the fact
that the Clinton administration was going to end, and both sides said we
understand this is the point of decision. 

HUME: What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in effect, said no? 

ROSS: Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the conflict. We had
one critical clause in this agreement, and that clause was, this is the end
of the conflict. 

Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he
has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open,
never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door.
For him to end the conflict is to end himself. 

HUME: Might it not also have been true, though, Dennis, that, because the
intifada had already begun -- so you had the Camp David offer rejected, the
violence begins anew, a new offer from the Clinton administration comes along,
the Israelis agree to it, Barak agrees to it... 

ROSS: Yes. 

HUME: ... might he not have concluded that the violence was working? 

ROSS: It is possible he concluded that. It is possible he thought he could
do and get more with the violence. There's no doubt in my mind that he thought
the violence would create pressure on the Israelis and on us and maybe the
rest of the world. 

And I think there's one other factor. You have to understand that Barak was
able to reposition Israel internationally. Israel was seen as having
demonstrated unmistakably it wanted peace, and the reason it wasn't available,
achievable was because Arafat wouldn't accept it. 

Arafat needed to re-establish the Palestinians as a victim, and unfortunately
they are a victim, and we see it now in a terrible way. 

HUME: Dennis Ross, thank you so much.

response 3 of 173:

Apr 25 14:23 UTC 2002

We all know a U.S. ambassador would *never* be biased, right?

response 5 of 173:

Apr 25 17:28 UTC 2002

See maps.

response 7 of 173:

Apr 26 14:11 UTC 2002

Current News:

13:59   European Commission President Romano Prodi: Arafat was wrong not to
        accept Camp David agreement 

Old News:

Interview with Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Arafat's other appointed successor,
quoted from Al-Ayyam (PA) July 29, 2001: [from memri.org]

        Regarding the proposals which came up following Camp David, and
        specifically with regard to what was termed the Clinton Proposal...
        When they say: 'We offered you ninety-five percent,' I'm asking: 'Why
        not one hundred percent?' When they are saying, almost full control
        over Jerusalem: [I'm asking] 'Why wouldn't the control be full?'

Note that he admits that Israel offered 95% and shared sovereignty over
Jerusalem, but that he seems unfamiliar with the concept of negotiation
and compromise. He simply states: We want everything and that's that.
It gets worse:

        They left the Jerusalem issue for the last moment. At the beginning
        they spoke of the Wall, which consists of the Wailing Wall and the
        Western Wall. Later, they spoke of the Armenian Quarter, and then
        they spoke of the Al-Magharba neighborhood, which they call the
        'Jewish Quarter.' We told them: 'We would not agree that you would
        have any kind of presence in the Western Wall.

For those who kept up on the discussion of Jerusalem's Quarters in the
Spring'01 Agora cf, the Jewish Quarter appears on 100 year old maps that I
referenced (and, of course, much older maps) and is hardly a post-1967
phenomenon.  The Jewish Quarter ceased to be Jewish when, in violent
contravention of the UN Partition, the Arab Legion ethnically cleansed it
of all Jews and, in violation of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, Trans-Jordan
destroyed some Jewish holy sites (including 58 synagogues) and preculded
Jews from visiting others.  The Jewish Quarter was liberated and restored
by Israel in 1967.

Again, there is no room for compromise. Camp David turned from negotiations
to a hearing of Arab demands. And if Israel wasn't willing to appease 100%
of those demands, Arafat wasn't going to make peace. If you even believe
that he would have agreed to end the conflict even had Israel agreed to
his unreasonable demands.

The red line, meant to scuttle any chance of a negotiated settlement, was
that Israel would not be provided any presence at Judaism's holiest site.

response 9 of 173:

Apr 29 07:14 UTC 2002

From the New York Times, 03/11/01, p. 8:

        Some Palestinian intellectuals, professionals and business owners
        are trying to rise above their emotions and shake their heads clear.
        They are asking if there is, as a journalist, Daoud Kuttab, put in a
        recent column, a "point of diminishing returns."

        "For the first time since the outbreak of protests," Mr. Kuttab
        wrote, "Palestinian thinkers are starting to ask some of the hard
        questions: Where is all this leading to? Shouldn't we have accepted
        the Clinton ideas? Where does the return in Palestine and the Arab
        world to the 70's and 80's rhetoric get us? Are we entering into a
        dark tunnel without an end in sight?"

response 11 of 173:

May 4 17:35 UTC 2002

http://detnews.com/2002/editorial/0202/10/a13-412235.htm

Quiet Palestinian revolt 

   Arafat's presence creates a dilemma for Palestinians as well. Israelis,
especially hard-liners such as Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and former Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have long argued that there is no point in making
concessions to a man who cannot obtain any from his own people. But with
Arafat at the helm, Palestinians have difficulty gauging what concessions they
should make. 

   For instance, one of the central aspirations of the Palestinian nationalist
movement is to obtain the right of return of Palestinian refugees who were
kicked out of their homes by Israelis in the 1948 war. But Khalidi Shikaki,
a professor of political science who polls Palestinian opinion from his
research center in Ramallah, argues that Palestinians are more flexible on
this issue than it appears. 

   Palestinians may well settle for a right of return just into a new
Palestinian state and not into Israel proper, he says, if they receive all
of Gaza and 95 percent of a contiguous strip of the West Bank. This would
require Israel to dismantle its Jewish settlements in far-flung areas of the
West Bank and concentrate them into three blocks. Barring that, Shikaki
believes, the only other real sticking point would be the fate of Jerusalem.

   But Palestinians have little confidence that Arafat would cut the right
deal -- because he's already burned them once. 

   After Israel returned parts of the West Bank and Gaza to Arafat following
the 1993 Oslo accords, Palestinians hoped they would finally have a free state
with a flourishing economy. But Arafat has created instead a chaotic and
authoritarian entity that is fast slipping into an economic abyss. 

Corruption reaches the highest ranks of the Palestinian Authority, whose
members are in cahoots with Arafat's cronies in the al-Fatah, the political
organization that Arafat founded. They are all mostly outsiders who
accompanied Arafat when he returned from exile in Tunisia. 

   Although Arafat is not regarded as corrupt, al-Fatah and PA functionaries
run the country like their private fiefdom. They have enriched themselves on
the steady stream of development dollars that the international community
keeps releasing into the Palestinian economy. Meanwhile, the original
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza have seen their living standards plummet
since Israel's partial withdrawal from their territories. 

   In addition, the rule of law is nonexistent. Courts barely function,
revenge killings by rival clans are common and Arafat thwarted full democracy
by refusing to hold elections again. 

   According to Shikaki, it is hard to overestimate the disillusionment this
has created against Arafat and his peace process, especially among the young
and college educated. The intifada is as much a result of pent-up frustration
against Arafat's misrule and corruption as against Israel, he says. 

   Concurring with Shikaki is Danny Rubinstein, a commentator for the Israeli
newspaper, Ha'aretz. 

   "Sometime in the future," he recently wrote, "a research paper will likely
come to the conclusion that one of the primary reasons for the collapse of
the peace process ... was the chronic and utter havoc that reigned supreme
in the Palestinian regime."

response 13 of 173:

May 5 08:11 UTC 2002

No, they are NOT an issue. Israel agreed to do exactly that at Camp David.

The settlement blocks being the "Detroit", "Port Huron" and "Toledo"
analogies in my response to Marcus in item 93.  Note that none of these
blocks would be in the "UP" (Gaza), which Israel agreed to give 100% to
the PA. What do you think would be the fate of Jews in Gaza under the PA?

response 15 of 173:

May 5 20:37 UTC 2002

It appears painfully obvious that Aaron didn't bother to read response #1
and continues to regurgitate the same myths that US Ambassador Dennis Ross
was refuting. Unlike the secondary "interpretations" that Aaron lists, Ross
was there, day after day, over the course of 8 years of the Oslo process.

There is no "85%" Barak figure. Let's give Aaron the benefit of the doubt
that this was a typo and that he's kvetching about the difference between
95% and 97%. The 97% figure cited by Ross is a "net" figure, the sum of
95% + 2% in alternative lands. I've also quoted one of the top Palestinian
Arab negotiatiors referring to the 95% figure -- only to then indicate that
Arafat was unwilling to compromise, demanding 100% of the disputed territories.

From response #1:

 ROSS: The ideas were presented on December 23 by the president, and they
 basically said the following: On borders, there would be about a 5 percent
 annexation in the West Bank for the Israelis and a 2 percent swap. So there
 would be a net 97 percent of the territory that would go to the Palestinians.

 ROSS: The Israelis would have gotten completely out of Gaza.

From response #7:

        Regarding the proposals which came up following Camp David, and
        specifically with regard to what was termed the Clinton Proposal...
        When they say: 'We offered you ninety-five percent,' I'm asking: 'Why
        not one hundred percent?' When they are saying, almost full control
        over Jerusalem: [I'm asking] 'Why wouldn't the control be full?'

Then Aaron raises the myth that Israel walked away from negotiations at Taba.
Aaron's anti-Israel accusation goes further than the regular lie, that it was
the Israeli elections that ended the Taba process. He attempts to further
misportray this as a deliberate Israeli attempt to sabotage the peace talks.
Yet from response #1:

 HUME: Now, it is often said that this whole sequence of talks here sort of
 fell apart or ended or broke down or whatever because of the intervention of
 the Israeli elections. What about that?

 ROSS: The real issue you have to understand was not the Israeli elections.
 It was the end of the Clinton administration. The reason we would come with
 what was a culminating offer was because we were out of time.

 They asked us to present the ideas, both sides. We were governed by the fact
 that the Clinton administration was going to end, and both sides said we
 understand this is the point of decision.

 HUME: What, in your view, was the reason that Arafat, in effect, said no?

 ROSS: Because fundamentally I do not believe he can end the conflict. We had
 one critical clause in this agreement, and that clause was, this is the end
 of the conflict.

 Arafat's whole life has been governed by struggle and a cause. Everything he
 has done as leader of the Palestinians is to always leave his options open,
 never close a door. He was being asked here, you've got to close the door.
 For him to end the conflict is to end himself.

response 17 of 173:

May 6 03:34 UTC 2002

That was nearly a year after Arafat rejected the paradigm of compromise
at Camp David and after more than 6 months of a terrorism campaign
directed at Israeli civilians. Or are you suggesting that Arafat rejected
Clinton's ideas in July 2000 and January 2001 because he knew what Barak
would write in May 2001?

The *FACT* is that Arafat rejected a deal that would have given him an
independent Palestinian Arab state in all of Gaza and on contiguous lands
totaling 97% of Judea & Samaria, sovereignty over eastern Jerusalem,
shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount, the so-called "right of return"
to the nascent Palestinian Arab state and $30 Billion in compensation for
the refugees.

What was Arafat asked in return? That Israel's only international airport
would be able to remain open (Israel would become too narrow for flights to
take-off and land without entering the airspace of the new Palestinian Arab
state), to compromise on a small (3-5%) area of the "west bank" which is
almost exclusively inhabited by Jews, and to end the conflict and make peace.

Unable to handle even such a minimal compromise, Arafat walked out of Camp
David and sought to do an end-run around the peace process, first by seeking
support for a unilateral declaration of independence (which would preclude
him from having to make any compromise or even from ending the conflict)
and then be (re) turning to terrorism, the use of violence as a political
tool to strengthen his negotiating position.

response 19 of 173:

May 6 14:45 UTC 2002

Perhaps, Scott, you are too dumb to be able to understand what you read.

BARAK AGREED TO THE CAMP DAVID AND TABA PROPOSALS AT THE TIME THEY WERE
PRESENTED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON.

THOSE PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE ESTABLISHED A PALESTINIAN ARAB STATE IN ALL
OF GAZA AND ON A NET OF 97% OF THE "WEST BANK".

The *FACTS* (from the American ambassador who presented the plans alongside
President Clinton) are in response #1. These facts closely match what Israeli
and Arab negotiators have stated.

Some have incorrectly argued that the plan was not generous because they
were not fully aware of everything that was included (many of the criticisms
they make are flat out wrong. For example, that the WB would have been turned
into "cantons" -- no, it was contiguous, or that it would be an island
controlled by Israel -- no, Israel would continue to patrol the Jordan
valley only for an interim period of 6 years.)

The other criticisms are that the plan was not generous enough, that it
could have included more. Is that ever not true? Perhaps "refugees" should
have received $31 or $40 or $100 Billion instead of $30 Billion?
How much generosity is generous "enough"?

Surely if Arafat was interested in a deal, any deal at all, he should have
provided a counter-offer instead of first pursuing a unilateral declaration
of independence (a state without first establishing peace) and then opting
for violence and terrorism for political reasons.

Arafat didn't reject any particular component of the deal, he rejected any
deal based on compromise. After 8 years of negotiations based on compromise,
Arafat rejected the paradigm of compromise.

response 21 of 173:

May 7 18:28 UTC 2002

Scott, do you have any sources or facts to support your fancies?

Are you suggesting that President Clinton and US Ambassador Dennis Ross
are lying about what happened at Camp David and Taba?  (Are the Arab
negotiators who have corroborated the above also lying?)

Should I also be silent about the murder of over 1000 Arab "collaborators"
by Arab death squads -- with tie-ins to the Palestinian Authority -- because
JFK was assassinated by an American?

Another big difference, though, is that Rabin's assassin was arrested and
tried by Israel and will remain behind bars for the rest of his life.
The PA Police, when it's not supporting the Arab death squads, turns a
blind eye to their activity. Even if perpetrators were arrested and tried,
the revolving-door jails would not hold them for long.

response 23 of 173:

May 8 02:16 UTC 2002

Clearly, Scott, you seem to think that your sources are biased otherwise
you'd have already posted them. (Note that I've quoted from such "biased"
sources as the Washington Post, NY Times Book Review, Fox News, Time, etc.
Are you going to do more cut-&-paste from electricintifadah.com? That's
fine if you'll be willing to go over the material, but I suspect that like
in the Winter Agora, you'll post this and then be unable to discuss it.)

(If you must know, I voted for Clinton twice, and for Gore.)