I propose Grex adopt Condorcet voting for the 2003 election. Discuss.15 responses total.
What is "Condorcet voting"?
See http://electionmethods.org/CondorcetEx.htm It's questionable whether Condorcet voting (which I knew nothing about until 5 minutes ago) is consistent with Article 4.d of the bylaws, and so might require a bylaw amendment to adopt. Not to mention new voting software. I doubt there's enough lead time for the 2003 election, but it might be worth discussing as a possibility for next year.
(which version: basic, plain SSD, or "cloneproof" SSD? additionally, it appears to be more ideal for elections for a single position as opposed to multiple positions, which is what board races usually are.)
For a multiple race election, it seems like the logical approach would be to run the matrix for a single winner, and then repeat until all available seats are filled, but in each repetition, remove from the existing matrix all pairs in which winners of previous rounds are defeated.
(isn't it also as logical to use the method once, reducing until only the desired number of candidates remain?)
This is m-net deja vu
jp2 quite often enters things on both Grex and M-Net.
Can we stick with Remmers program? It ain't broke, as far as I can see.
Remmers'
If someone wants to propose a change in Grex's voting method, I would ask that they come up with an explanation to be placed on Grex as to what it is, how it works, why it is better, and why we should switch to it. I am not interested in doing the research myself and then hoping the information I locate is what the author of the proposal has in mind.
What benefit does Condorcet voting provide to Grex?
We'd also need a specific set of rules for the voteadm to follow in deciding how to resolve the votes. I'm open to the idea of a newfangled voting method, but I'd like to see the details.
I did read through the site. Condorcet voting lets the voters rank their votes. If there were an election with a contested seat between there people, one could vote for one of them as their #1 choice, another as their #2 choice, and the 3rd as their #3 choice. That way, if you preferred #1 but didn't think they had a chance, and hated #3, you wouldn't have to just vote for #2 to keep #3 from winning. The site listed above touts this as a better method for voting for president of the United States and other high-visibility elections with numerous candidates but only two real choices (Republican and Democrat). I take Jamie's entering of this item as being a "hey, look what I just stumbled across" response, rather than a proposal that Grex would be better off if it used Condorcet voting for it's elections. I don't see any way that this could even possibly improve Grex. I've rarely seen an election here where I thought there were *any* bad candidates. Usually, there are 7 or 8 candidates for 3 seats, and my impulse is to propose increasing the number of openings because I want them all to win. I hardly ever want to vote against anyone, and voting against people is what the Condorcet system is for.
(I'll agree that Grex has been blessed with more good board candidates than can be elected. But there's a logistic reason not to increase board size -- the complexity of getting N people at the same time and place for a meeting tends to increase faster than linearly with N. It's hard enough with N = 7, the current number.) I tend to agree with jep's estimate of the usefulness of this system for Grex. However, if folks decide that they'd like to change to a new election scheme, I'm certainly willing to look into automating it via a new vote program. I'd need sufficient lead time, though. As I said earlier, this year is out of the question.
TROGG IS DAVID BLAINE
You have several choices: