Do we hold an ethical obligation to dissuade beliefs which we believe to be
false? Some food for thought:

- The notion of a belief or conviction being false is highly problematic,
primarily because it appears to be epistemologically impossible to determine
just what that entails--however, for all practical purposes, I'm certain that
we can agree that there are cases in which people hold convictions which show
every sign of being false. Consider for instance the claim that the world is,
in fact, only about 6,000 years old and that it was created by an omnipotent
deity in six days--or, more dubiously, the claim that there is no such thing
as climate change, and that we will therefore not be required to take action
to prevent it.

- The two cases differ, both with respect to the certainty with which they
can be said to be false, as well as to the potential harm incurred by failing
to reject them as false: it seems that young earth creationism does little
direct harm to others than those who choose to believe in it (and, perhaps,
their close relatives), whereas the belief that we should do nothing to
prevent climate change could have severe adverse effects on our quality of
life if it turns out that we could have prevented it if we did act.

- If we bypass the problem of how to determining the nature of false belief,
we might end up repressing those who hold or express beliefs which are
considered false--if we can legitimate the dissuasion of false belief, is
there any reason why we should not use force in doing so? If the answer to
the original question is 'yes', does that imply that we should not tolerate
false belief any longer--and, if not, why not?

- On the other hand, it seems that if there were a way by which we might
distinguish legitimate opinions from those that are illegitimate, then that
might help us discourage the dissemination and propagation of the latter with
some justification. However, is that true? And if it is, would it justify the
effort put into finding some sort of epistemologically fast and loose way of
determining the falsity of a belief, or more precisely, its likelihood of
being false? Is it possible at all to devise such a method, setting out with
an ambition of attaining some objectivity, or are such judgments inherently
subjective?

1 responses total.

I don't know whether to be encouraged or discouraged by
this item.

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