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Grex > Agora56 > #156: Protecting Your Tax Dollars--or Pissing Them Away? | |
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| 25 new of 100 responses total. |
cyklone
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response 25 of 100:
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Mar 9 03:34 UTC 2006 |
Ya'll keep ignoring the question of why it's a good idea to concentrate even
more power in the hands of a power-hungry executive branch. As marcvh has
pointed out, and most of ya'll have ignored, it makes much more sense to ban
riders and additions to bills without adequate time to read them. Better yet,
ban them altogether and require single item bills.
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crimson
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response 26 of 100:
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Mar 9 05:45 UTC 2006 |
Re #25: Who said anything at all about concentrating power? And since when
can every issue be reduced to a singe item bill? (At the very least, every
bill that actually has an effect ought to have sections for what it mandates
and anticipated logistics.)
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rcurl
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response 27 of 100:
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Mar 9 06:03 UTC 2006 |
I think bills should be *single subject*, at least. Miltary budgets shouldn't
have items added for building bridges to nowhere in Alaska, for example.
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mcnally
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response 28 of 100:
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Mar 9 06:33 UTC 2006 |
(for what it's worth, though I don't disagree with you, the "bridge to
nowhere" was funded as part of an omnibus transportation bill.)
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cyklone
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response 29 of 100:
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Mar 9 14:17 UTC 2006 |
Re #25: SIngle item bills are no problem; in fact they're required in
Michigan. And giving the executive branch the power to control
appropriations is clearly a concentration of power. It's not my fault
you're too dim to perceive that.
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rcurl
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response 30 of 100:
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Mar 9 17:11 UTC 2006 |
Re #28: quite right. I misrecollected.
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kingjon
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response 31 of 100:
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Mar 9 19:14 UTC 2006 |
Re #29: Who said anything about giving the executive branch the power to
control appropriations? If Congress likes the thing the president returns to it
for review, it can pass it again, with a 2/3 vote if he vetoes that.
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keesan
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response 32 of 100:
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Mar 9 20:32 UTC 2006 |
So a president represents the ruling party rather than a coalition of states.
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cyklone
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response 33 of 100:
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Mar 9 22:22 UTC 2006 |
Re #31: Use your imagination, junior. If the president doesn't like the
way a certain legislator is leaning, all he has to do is pass word that he
may not look too favorably on a particularl spending item the legislator
favors. If the legislator doesn't play ball, boom, line item veto. Get it
now?
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kingjon
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response 34 of 100:
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Mar 9 22:36 UTC 2006 |
So? You can say the same thing about every other check the executive branch has
on the legislature. Would you favor having only a symbolic executive? I know
*I* certainly wouldn't.
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marcvh
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response 35 of 100:
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Mar 9 22:38 UTC 2006 |
I know that I think the executive currently has too much power, and so I'll
tend to oppose pretty much anything that serves to expand it. And no,
that isn't a purely partisan view, although certainly it is influenced by
the recent behavior of the executive.
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cyklone
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response 36 of 100:
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Mar 9 22:44 UTC 2006 |
Re #34: Well, you seem remotely capable of grasping this, so here goes: There
is a system called "checks and balances." The line item veto changes that.
Simply pointing out the executive branch, by definition, already has some
checks, is in no way a valid argument for granting more checks to that branch
unless your are willing to even things out by having that branch give up some
other check or providing a new check to the legislative branch.
You argument reduces to "since the executive branch already exercises
certain powers, no harm can be done by giving it more power." Sorry, try
harder next time.
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kingjon
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response 37 of 100:
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Mar 9 22:56 UTC 2006 |
No, my argument is that "every check can be used wrongfully, so saying that a
proposed power may be used wrongfully does not guarantee that it should not be
made law."
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cyklone
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response 38 of 100:
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Mar 10 01:02 UTC 2006 |
In that case your argument is even weaker. The fact that Congress has a
power that may be used wrongfully, yet (based on your argument) can also
be used properly, does not justify removing that power from Congress and
placing it in the hands of the President in violation of the careful
system of checks and balances set up by the founding fathers. The correct
solution is to find a way for Congress to stop abusing that power, while
still reserving that power to Congress. Which gets back to the point
I've made all along: limit the scope of each bill to a single
issue and put procedural safeguards in place to prevent votes on massive
bills finalized only hours before the vote. What's so hard to understand
about that?
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kingjon
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response 39 of 100:
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Mar 10 01:39 UTC 2006 |
I would be in favor of that (except that might be some things that can't be
dealt with in a "single-item" bill) -- as well as something preventing anything
from being passed without a funding plan -- but I don't think it would pass.
I'm not arguing for the extension of anyone's power, since the president under
this proposal could not do anything to set policy that he could not before.
Rather, this lets him be a more precise check on Congress.
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rcurl
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response 40 of 100:
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Mar 10 02:33 UTC 2006 |
Why doesn't Bush just veto the whole thing and then Congress could pass it
over his veto, and the system is preserved as is. If they can't pass it over
his veto, then they might amend it. I'm coming to think - what's the problem?
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cyklone
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response 41 of 100:
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Mar 10 03:28 UTC 2006 |
The problem is it's another false conservative meme, the ultimate goal of it
being to increase the power of the "strong executive" (which is the theory
many Bush insiders use to justify their power grabs).
Klingon once again shows how a lack of knowledge is as bad as a lack of
intelligence. He raises the red herring about how a bill may need to
address more than one issue while ignoring the lesson of Michigan, the
very state in which he lives and presumably received or receives an
education. He should sue his school for failing to teach basic state
civics.
Complex issues are addressed by multiple bills, sometimes with clauses
attached saying one won't become effective unless the other bill is
passed. This recently occured in the battle to reform taxes. One bill was
to cut certain taxes and the other was to replace some of the lost
revenue. They both had to pass to take effect. If it works for MI it can
work in DC. And after all, good conservatives (at least the real ones)
believe states rights are important for many reasons, including that each
state is a "lab" where the citizens can tinker with their form of
government.
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kingjon
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response 42 of 100:
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Mar 10 04:03 UTC 2006 |
"The problem is" you're begging the question. I haven't seen any evidence that
this is a conservative power grab.
As for vetoing a whole bill -- what about the budget, whose failure to pass
could (I presume) make the government shut down? I can think of a whole host of
other examples where a veto would just be reported as "a veto" with guaranteed
negative consequences due to public disapproval.
Like I said, I would support a single-item-bill requirement (as well as a
requirement that each bill specify a funding source), but I don't think it'll
pass. This, at least, is on the table. It's not the best solution, but it's a
start.
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cyklone
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response 43 of 100:
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Mar 10 13:27 UTC 2006 |
Are you seriously telling me you haven't read that Cheney, Rumsfeld, et al
believe the executive branch was weakened during Watergate and needs to be
restored to power? Given this is amply documented, I don't think it's much
of a stretch to infer the line item veto is part of their efforts to increase
the power of the executive branch.
I can't even tell what point you're trying to make in the second
paragraph. Clinton and Congress played the "shut down the government"
staredown and the US survived. I'm not sure what "guaranteed negative
consequences" you think resulted from that bit of history.
And think about the what you're saying in the third paragraph. There's a
good idea you don't think will pass and bad idea proposed by the president
that might pass. Common sense suggests trying the good idea before
starting to dismantle centuries of checks and balances.
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johnnie
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response 44 of 100:
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Mar 10 13:54 UTC 2006 |
The stated desire for a line-item veto may be nothing more than playing
the blame game: "It's not my fault that deficits are so high--Congress
can't control their spending."
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marcvh
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response 45 of 100:
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Mar 10 15:28 UTC 2006 |
> I'm not sure what "guaranteed negative consequences" you think
> resulted from that bit of history.
Well, one of them was a dramatic expansion in the role of unpaid
interns, since they were not impacted by a lack of money. One of those
unpaid interns ended up making major news, although I don't think the
long-term impact on our nation was particuarly significant.
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kingjon
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response 46 of 100:
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Mar 10 18:44 UTC 2006 |
"X exists" "Y exists" "therefore X implies Y" is bad logic.
By "guaranteed negative consequences" I mean such things as (not an exclusive
list) losing supporters in Congress, losing votes in the next election, being
forced to use political capital that was being saved for something else, etc.
Shutting the government down was supposed to be separate from that.
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cyklone
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response 47 of 100:
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Mar 10 19:50 UTC 2006 |
So a president shouldn't use a regular veto because the costs (as you perceive
them) may be too high to the president? I realize you're young and may not
remember many presidents before Bush. However, most presidents had no problem
vetoing bills they disagreed with strongly. Bush is a freak in this regard
in that he has yet to veto a bill, as if he considers that some sort of badge
of honor. Again, though, history has shown that the REGULAR veto can be used,
and has been used, effectively.
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kingjon
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response 48 of 100:
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Mar 10 22:34 UTC 2006 |
There are situations where a regular veto would not be cost-effective -- such
as a bill which is the President's idea, that he thinks is very important, that
he's maneuvered through Congress, that someone at the last minute attaches a
provision he's absolutely opposed to. He couldn't get it through a second time
if he vetoed it, and he thinks that it is really important, but also that it's
really important that the unwanted addition not pass. What would you suggest
here?
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mcnally
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response 49 of 100:
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Mar 10 22:44 UTC 2006 |
re #48: if I worked for the White House I'd suggest he sign the bill
containing the parts he wants and then add a "signing statement" explaining
that he's simply going to ignore the parts he doesn't like, which is exactly
what Bush did when his first major veto threat (to preserve his current
torture policies) was threatened by a widely-supported rider sponsored by
John McCain..
re #47: Bush's non-use of the veto power is pretty unique and is based
on a number of unusual factors, including: (1) the fact that all three
branches of government are controlled by his party, (2) the fact that
Congress has rubberstamped virtually everything he's asked for except
Social Security reform, and (3) his advisors' unique legal theories,
which basically boil down to the notion that as long as he says it's
necessary to do his job the president can ignore any laws and suspend
any rights he wants (so long as he doesn't push the the theory far enough
to provoke a confrontation with Congress or the courts.)
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