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Grex > Agora47 > #221: The Fall 2003 Electronic Voting Item | |
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| 25 new of 54 responses total. |
other
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response 25 of 54:
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Dec 17 20:52 UTC 2003 |
You could just as well say that, but it is adequately implied.
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tod
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response 26 of 54:
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Dec 17 21:01 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
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jmsaul
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response 27 of 54:
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Dec 18 00:52 UTC 2003 |
At this point, the companies have been so sloppy with the machines that even
if they do work with the Republicans to rig an election, there will be
reasonable doubt because anyone with access to the machines could have done
it. If the outcome is challenged, we'll probably wind up with another "it's
best to leave well enough alone" ruling like the one for the presidential
election in 2000.
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gull
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response 28 of 54:
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Dec 18 04:29 UTC 2003 |
Re resp:23: Yes, exactly.
Re resp:27: Quite possibly. I think if there are any irregularities in
this election, and Bush is the winner, there will be a lot of pressure
from the executive branch to gloss over any problems "for the good of
the country." (If a Democrat is elected and there are irregularities,
we can expect a long, drawn-out investigation, I'm sure.)
Some points to consider:
1. Vote fraud (by either side) is not exactly unheard of. We're not
talking about something new in concept here, just on a larger scale.
2. Diebold and other electronic voting companies have refused to let
anyone outside the company review their source code. Why? What are
they hiding?
3. There is no auditing capability on most electronic voting machines.
There have already been cases of machine malfunctions that were only
caught because they produced obviously incorrect numbers -- for example,
more people voting than are registered in a precinct, or a negative
number of votes. If the errors had been more subtle, they would NEVER
have been caught.
4. Diebold his vigorously resisted requests to add auditing capability.
The more they resist, the more it looks like a deliberate decision
instead of a design oversight.
Odds are there's no conspiracy afoot, but if you add up all the above
factors it does smell a little funny. What troubles me, though, is that
there is currently NO way we can ever know if tampering or malfunctions
have occurred. And very few people seem to particularly care.
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jep
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response 29 of 54:
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Dec 18 14:45 UTC 2003 |
I think Diebold, like all software makers, wants to protect it's source
code for business reasons. My company wouldn't allow it's source code
to be reviewed externally, any more than Microsoft would or Oracle
would. It's pretty radical to insist that Diebold must be trying to
fix elections because they follow a standard business practice of their
industry.
I agree there has to be auditing for electronic voting. That omission
would be a severe oversight that has to be corrected before I'd be
comfortable with electronic voting.
It seems likely to me that Diebold doesn't want to add it *for free*.
If it wasn't part of what they were contracted to provide, then that
would be understandable. If they fulfilled specs, and then auditing
was brought up later, it's unfair to accuse them of not providing what
they were supposed to.
Are they refusing to discuss additional contracts to provide for
auditing to be added? If they're turning down business, then I could
see a reason to be suspicious and think "conspiracy". I haven't seen
any statements from you or anyone else stating that to be the case and
so I assume it's not.
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gull
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response 30 of 54:
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Dec 18 14:58 UTC 2003 |
I'm not sure if they've outright refused, but they've made vigorous
attempts to downplay the importance of auditing. And see their
statement above that they hoped a Republican governor would get elected
and stop Maryland from insisting on paper audit trains.
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scott
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response 31 of 54:
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Dec 18 15:01 UTC 2003 |
The precedent does exist in computerized slot machines, though. That's why
I'm not surprised that Nevada is the first state which seems like it
understands the issues completely.
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gull
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response 32 of 54:
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Dec 18 15:19 UTC 2003 |
I would feel pretty confident about the security and accuracy of any
voting system that the Nevada Gaming Board had approved. They've been
dealing with similar issues for years.
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jp2
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response 33 of 54:
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Dec 18 15:40 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
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twenex
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response 34 of 54:
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Dec 18 16:51 UTC 2003 |
Re: #29: If I could think of any way to have a clear public audit of
their code other than making it opensource, I'd be more inclined not
to demand they cease and desist their evil, bloodthirsty, proprietary,
corrupt, ultra-capitalist monopolistic ways.
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twenex
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response 35 of 54:
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Dec 18 16:53 UTC 2003 |
Oops.
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mcnally
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response 36 of 54:
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Dec 18 19:01 UTC 2003 |
re #29: I'm pretty sure that Microsoft *does* allow review of some
of its code, though it requires non-disclosure agreements and places
other restrictions on the process as well.
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scott
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response 37 of 54:
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Dec 18 23:09 UTC 2003 |
Re 33:
Removable memory devices, WiFi interfaces, and "updated" software which is
not the same as the officially approved software.
Those are all things I've seen mentioned in various stories about voting
computers.
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gull
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response 38 of 54:
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Dec 18 23:28 UTC 2003 |
Re resp:36: Yes. In fact, I'm told there are plenty of outside
companies with access to Microsoft source code under various agreements.
(This is probably why you occasionally see Windows source code leaked.)
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jmsaul
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response 39 of 54:
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Dec 18 23:50 UTC 2003 |
I think we need to say "tough shit" on the trade secret issue, and make it
a requirement that you have to open your code if you're going to sell
electronic voting machines.
Either that, or add a paper audit trail.
Your choice.
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richard
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response 40 of 54:
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Dec 19 03:37 UTC 2003 |
electronic voting? here in new york city, we don't even have voting booths
that use electricity! We still use these old clunkers, that weigh about
a thousand pounds each, where the ballot is spread out over an entire
wall and you have to flip switches and pull the lever. See, it takes
manpower to set up those old voting booths, and the unions control that
manpower. And the unions run new york city. So we won't get to
electronic voting here until/if we get to the point where we phase out the
out manual voting booths, which doesn't seem like it will ever happen
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russ
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response 41 of 54:
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Dec 19 05:56 UTC 2003 |
Re #21: We'd call it Chicago. ;-)
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jp2
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response 42 of 54:
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Dec 19 11:32 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
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gull
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response 43 of 54:
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Dec 19 15:20 UTC 2003 |
Diebold may get their knuckles rapped:
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/business/7511145.htm
"SACRAMENTO - Secretary of State Kevin Shelley said Tuesday that Diebold
Elections Systems could lose the right to sell electronic voting
machines in California after state auditors found the company
distributed software that had not been approved by election officials.
"The auditors reported that voters in 17 California counties cast
ballots in recent elections using software that had not been certified
by the state. And voters in Los Angeles County and two smaller counties
voted on machines installed with software that was not approved by the
Federal Election Commission."
Diebold's president, Bob Urosevich, said the changes were "cosmetic" and
blamed the counties for not tracking the software more closely.
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other
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response 44 of 54:
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Dec 19 16:09 UTC 2003 |
Of COURSE he did.
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other
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response 45 of 54:
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Dec 19 16:10 UTC 2003 |
(And that alone should result in the ban being put into place.)
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klg
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response 46 of 54:
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Dec 19 17:31 UTC 2003 |
Herr richard:
Careful, buddy. Going around badmouthing unions like that will get you
drummed out of the Democratic Party.
klg
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mcnally
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response 47 of 54:
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Dec 19 19:02 UTC 2003 |
re #42:
> The BIN will be such that only the voter can identify his ballot later.
Any security scheme which relies on the voter to "identify his
ballot later" sounds to me to be both (a) unworkably cumbersome,
and (b) too susceptible to post-election voter manipulation.
Imagine this kind of validation were used in the 2000 presidential
election. How much do you think it would have been worth to either
party to change or invalidate a few hundred votes in Florida?
re #43:
> Diebold's president, Bob Urosevich, said the changes were "cosmetic"
> and blamed the counties for not tracking the software more closely.
So Bob Urosevich is blaming California for not repeating what one
would hope is a lengthy and thorough certification process for the
sake of "cosmetic" changes to the software. (Note: one *hopes*
that it's a lengthy and thorough certification process, but one fears
that it is not..)
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jp2
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response 48 of 54:
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Dec 19 19:43 UTC 2003 |
This response has been erased.
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mcnally
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response 49 of 54:
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Dec 19 20:25 UTC 2003 |
I understand that you could do that but if the whole vote relies on
voter-held information for verification purposes, then a suborned voter
could essentially withdraw their ballot by claiming it invalid. In a
close election, that could be enough to throw the race to the other side.
And if the information supplied to the voter isn't necessary to validate
her ballot, then what's it for?
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