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Grex > Coop12 > #127: Grex, once again, has pissed me off | |
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Message |
| 19 new of 184 responses total. |
scott
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response 166 of 184:
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Sep 11 19:51 UTC 2002 |
Well, I buy car insurance without ever intending to wreck my car. Is that
a waste of my money?
How exactly *would* we verify said ID, anyway? Demand a notarized declaration
that the ID is valid, cosigned by the local police chief? How far would be
sufficient to be completely certain the ID wasn't stolen/faked?
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aruba
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response 167 of 184:
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Sep 11 19:52 UTC 2002 |
Re #63: Such evidence is in coop item 16, which you participated in heavily.
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aruba
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response 168 of 184:
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Sep 11 19:55 UTC 2002 |
Also, there was a very long discussion of the one person, one vote policy in
coop9, item 7.
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cross
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response 169 of 184:
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Sep 11 23:32 UTC 2002 |
Regarding #93; Yes, I worry about it.
Regrding #111; The question is, what data do you keep? If they send you
a driver's license, that's fine. Do you need to keep their DL number and
other identifiers, or just their name, address, and possibly phone number?
Regarding #113; So far, I've never heard of an Internet cafe being sued.
It seems unlikely that it would happen. However, I agree with you about
the geographic limitation versus global accessability.
Regarding #115; That sounds like an excellent solution; look at the ID,
record the name and address, etc, and then destroy it.
Regarding #117; I had forgotten about that incident; it was rather
amusing. It's a good point, but even if that company had sent a driver's
license or similar, that doesn't mean it would need to be retained.
There's a minimum of information that grex *needs*, and it ideally it
shouldn't store any more than that.
Regarding #137; Yes, I am telling you that public kiosks at Columbia
allow public access (isn't that implicit in the definition of ``public
kiosk?''), and I'm telling you that a Java applet can save files to the
local machine's disk. Of course they have a network interface; they're
kiosks. They run Linux, boot off the network, and reinitialize the disc
every time they come up; if you're concerned about security, power-cycle
the machine. The diskette drives have a physical lock mechanism in them
that prevents one from booting off a floppy, but we can afford that.
Regarding #140; The issue isn't the *asking* of ID, it's what is done
with the ID after its received.
Regarding #142; Seeing an ID doesn't mean you have to keep it.
Regarding #161; dude, that's just rude.
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jp2
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response 170 of 184:
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Sep 12 02:58 UTC 2002 |
This response has been erased.
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bhelliom
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response 171 of 184:
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Sep 12 17:23 UTC 2002 |
resp:170 - Believe what you will.
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bhelliom
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response 172 of 184:
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Sep 12 17:26 UTC 2002 |
resp:165 - Believe I'm not paying attention, Sapna, if that makes you
happy.
#171 wasn't actually meant for resp:165, not resp:170.
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mynxcat
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response 173 of 184:
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Sep 12 17:31 UTC 2002 |
This response has been erased.
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mynxcat
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response 174 of 184:
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Sep 12 17:32 UTC 2002 |
Couldn't come up with a better explanation?
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polytarp
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response 175 of 184:
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Sep 12 21:28 UTC 2002 |
THRASHHHH LIBRAARIES!
FUCKING COMMIES!
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aruba
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response 176 of 184:
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Sep 13 02:09 UTC 2002 |
Re #170: Read the other item, them, if you're interested in how the policy
got to be what it is.
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aruba
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response 177 of 184:
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Sep 13 02:10 UTC 2002 |
Re #169: Dan, if you're worried about Jamie's brain falling out of his
head, I think you are wrrying too much.
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cross
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response 178 of 184:
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Sep 13 18:34 UTC 2002 |
Regarding #177; Well, I was more worried about *my* brain falling out of
my head; quantum effects are kind of scary, eh? :-)
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aruba
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response 179 of 184:
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Sep 13 22:37 UTC 2002 |
Still, I think you should just have a beer.
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cross
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response 180 of 184:
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Sep 15 18:45 UTC 2002 |
Only if it's a Yuengling.
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aruba
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response 181 of 184:
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Sep 15 20:40 UTC 2002 |
Sure. I'll join you.
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cross
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response 182 of 184:
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Sep 15 22:15 UTC 2002 |
Sounds great. Let me know the next time you're in New York. :-)
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devnull
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response 183 of 184:
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Oct 2 17:19 UTC 2002 |
While you might tell the police that you haven't verified an ID, and thus
you can't be certain of its accuracy, can the police necessarily be trusted
to treat it as if it might be inaccurate? I've certainly heard enough
claims of police fabricating evidence that this bothers me.
And the stolen school ID case that Marcus mentions is an interesting one;
what would have happened if that ID had actually been copied, rather than
the original sent?
I think a check provides a reasonable level of verification, in that if
someone writes a forged check against my account, I will probably notice
and say something to my bank. Knowing where an ID has traveled might be
a bit harder.
I do find myself wondering if providing a phone number and having the treasurer
call that number might be more effective verification. Yes, it would cost
something, but it would cost less than $1 to verify each member, at least
in the US, I would expect. Or, perhaps do both phoning and getting ID.
As for storing the data: I don't have any problem with trusting aruba to not
do anything dishonest, but it's a little bit harder to feel confident that
his computer hasn't been compromised by some sort of malicous software.
And encryption doesn't provide any protection against keystroke recording
software, really. (Well, it might raise the bar far enough to make some
attacks fail.)
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aruba
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response 184 of 184:
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Oct 2 19:06 UTC 2002 |
If I had received a copy of a school id instead of an actual id, I probably
wouldn't have worried about it. It turned out that the person in question
was a vandal,though, and in response to that incident I have started
notifying staff by mail whenever I add a new member, in case the new member
is a known vandal. In that case I might get suspicious enough to do
something else toward verifying that the ID came from the person it
identifies.
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